Sixth-generation fighter jet development was never just one of many military programs; for France, it has always been a symbol of national sovereignty. It was precisely this fact that lay behind the collapse of the FCAS project, which was supposed to bring Paris together with Germany – and later Spain as well – starting in 2017. Disputes over program leadership, intellectual property protection, and the scope of technology transfer ultimately outweighed political declarations of European cooperation. The result was the end of a project worth approximately 100 billion euros and the question of whether Europe will be able to create a common air superiority system for the second half of the 21st century or whether it will embark on the path of several competing programs.

The ability to design and manufacture fighter jets is one of the pillars of France’s strategic autonomy, which is linked to its nuclear deterrent, independent foreign policy, and long-term export strategy. Éric Trappier, CEO of Dassault Aviation, has repeatedly emphasized that France possesses unique capabilities acquired over decades of developing the Mirage and Rafale aircraft. For this reason, Paris was reluctant to hand over critical competencies to its German partners.

From the French perspective, this was a non-negotiable issue. If Dassault Aviation were to transfer extensive design knowledge, flight control algorithms, stealth technology, or methodologies for designing next-generation fighter jets to German firms, it would be creating a future competitor. In an environment where exports form the foundation of the Rafale program’s economy, protecting know-how takes on the same importance as the development of the new aircraft itself. Éric Trappier therefore advocated during the negotiations for France to hold a dominant position in the NGWS (Next Generation Weapon System) program, which was intended to form the core of FCAS.

Germany, on the other hand, pursued a different goal. In recent years, Berlin has been significantly strengthening its defense industry while simultaneously striving to acquire full-fledged capabilities in the field of military aviation. Following the approval of extensive investments in the Bundeswehr, the German government has also been speaking more and more frequently about industrial sovereignty. Germany’s new air strategy combines both topics and regards the ability to develop and manufacture complex aviation systems as the foundation of national sovereignty.

It was here that two legitimate national strategies clashed. France wanted to preserve its unique capabilities, while Germany wanted to acquire those same capabilities. As soon as the negotiations turned to the issue of technology ownership and decision-making authority, the program’s collapse began to seem increasingly likely. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s decision to terminate the joint development of the NGWS manned aircraft therefore did not come as much of a surprise. On the contrary, it confirmed a deeper trend in European defense policy, in which national control over key military technologies takes precedence over European integration.

This is not just about the aircraft itself. Sixth-generation programs encompass next-level stealth technologies, distributed data networks, advanced artificial intelligence, unmanned escort vehicles, next-generation sensors, and extensive cloud-based architectures for combat operations. In their statement, the German participants in FCAS (known as “Team Gen 6”) noted that capabilities in the areas of stealth, resilient network connectivity, and distributed data processing represent technologies that will determine the outcome of future conflicts.

Following the collapse of FCAS, the question of how to proceed naturally arises. Berlin has several options. The first is to join the GCAP program, which is being developed jointly by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan. This option has been garnering considerable attention in recent weeks. Both the Italian company Leonardo and Italian government officials have publicly expressed their openness to German participation.

The reasons are clear, as Germany has a strong industrial base, extensive financial resources, and the potential for a large number of orders. As a result, the GCAP program would gain additional investment and greater European legitimacy. At the same time, however, Berlin’s entry will entail complex negotiations regarding the division of labor, industrial shares, and access to technology. Furthermore, Japan has long emphasized the priority of meeting the deadline for the aircraft’s entry into service around 2035 due to concerns about China’s technological progress.

The second option is cooperation with Sweden. Although Saab is proceeding cautiously for now, it is simultaneously conducting studies on a future successor to the Gripen aircraft. Sweden has experience in developing combat aircraft, and at the same time, it is not an industrial giant with a dominant market position. For Germany, this could be a partner that offers greater scope for sharing expertise.

A purely German program is the third option. This is precisely the option being advocated by the “Team Gen 6” consortium, which brings together Airbus Defence and Space, Hensoldt, MTU Aero Engines, MBDA Deutschland, Diehl Defence, Rohde & Schwarz, Liebherr Aerospace, and Autoflug. These players point to their long-standing experience working on FCAS in the areas of stealth technology, sensors, network connectivity, and artificial intelligence. In their view, the time is right to develop a European aircraft under German leadership. Such a move would mark a fundamental shift in Europe’s defense architecture. Since World War II, Germany has never independently developed a modern combat aircraft; even the Eurofighter Typhoon was created as a multinational project.

In addition to these options, there is a fourth path. The Bundeswehr could expand its fleet of F-35 aircraft. Germany has already ordered 35 of them, and the American aircraft represents a technologically advanced platform with long-term prospects. From the perspective of operational capabilities, this would be the fastest and least risky solution; however, in terms of industrial sovereignty, Berlin would remain dependent on the United States.

France faces a different problem. Unlike Germany, it possesses the full range of capabilities needed to develop and manufacture a fighter jet. Dassault Aviation, Safran, and Thales constitute an industrial base capable of creating a successor to the Rafale. The main challenge is financing, as the state coffers are empty due to the massive costs of social welfare programs. Paris is therefore increasingly linking the future of the sixth-generation fighter to the export success of the modernized Rafale F5. French Defense Minister Catherine Vautrin has already confirmed negotiations with the United Arab Emirates as a potential customer, while talks are continuing regarding another major contract with India.

The logic behind the French approach builds on the Rafale program’s success to date. Export orders from Egypt, India, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, and Serbia have laid the financial foundation for the platform’s further development. If the Rafale F5 succeeds in gaining a foothold in foreign markets, a portion of the revenue could finance the development of a future sixth-generation aircraft. Éric Trappier himself has long emphasized this: “Exports are the path to financing the sovereignty of our country’s defense systems.” However, all customers are demanding access to critical technologies more than ever before, which is why the FCAS program failed. If the French have trouble sharing these technologies with the Germans, difficult negotiations are almost certain to arise with the Arabs or the Indians as well.

For Europe as a whole, however, a much broader question arises. The continent is currently heading toward a situation where GCAP, the potential German “Team Gen 6” program, and the future French successor to the Rafale will all exist in parallel. Each of these projects will require tens of billions of euros, thousands of specialists, and extensive research capabilities. At first glance, a larger number of manufacturers may seem like a positive thing. Competition fosters innovation, limits the monopoly power of suppliers, and creates downward pressure on prices. This argument also holds significance from the perspective of future users.

This brings us to the Czech dimension of the entire debate. The Czech Republic is entering the F-35 era, but at the same time, it must already be thinking about the future of its air force beyond 2050. If European sixth-generation fighter jets enter service around 2040 to 2045, Prague will be among the potential customers for these systems in the coming decades. In the short term, the existence of multiple manufacturers will give the Czech Republic a more advantageous negotiating position. The government will have a choice among multiple platforms, and manufacturers will compete for the customer. Theoretically, this will open the door to more favorable pricing terms, industrial cooperation, or the technological involvement of Czech companies.

However, the long-term perspective also reveals the other side of the issue. The development of a sixth-generation fighter jet represents one of the most demanding technological projects of our time. Any further fragmentation of European resources reduces economic efficiency, dilutes investments, and complicates the achievement of the necessary production volumes. If Europe divides its resources among three or four competing programs, each will incur higher unit costs. Smaller production runs automatically mean higher aircraft prices, more expensive logistics, and costlier upgrades. Ultimately, European countries – including the Czech Republic – could end up paying more, even though they formally have a wider range of options.

Geopolitical competition represents an even more significant dimension. The United States is developing the NGAD program (Boeing F-47), China is investing enormous resources in its own next-generation systems, and South Korea and Turkey are also demonstrating growing ambitions. In such an environment, European fragmentation weakens the continent’s ability to assert itself on the global market. The issue of future European fighter jets therefore goes beyond the scope of a single arms program; it is rather a conflict between national sovereignty and the European pooling of resources. The FCAS project has demonstrated how difficult it is to share know-how in areas that states consider fundamental to their strategic autonomy. At the same time, it has shown that without a certain degree of cooperation, the risk of fragmentation and weakening of the European defense industry increases.

The Czech Republic will certainly be among the countries that will feel the consequences of this decision. The cost, availability, and technological level of European sixth-generation fighter jets will depend on striking a balance between national ambitions and European industrial interests. The collapse of FCAS ultimately opens a debate about the shape of European air power in the second half of the 21st century and what role countries the size of the Czech Republic will play in it.