We bring you an interview with National Security Advisor Tomáš Pojar, not only about the Czech munitions initiative and the efforts to discredit it, but also about the importance of creating various alliances and forums to promote of Czech interests, the newly established position of the Commissioner for Strategic Communication, and the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, the outcome of which Vladimir Putin is awaiting, and which may bring a ceasefire on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Six months after the first reports about the Czech ammunition initiative, it seems that ammunition is starting to flow to Ukraine. Was your media strategy part of the project's implementation, with contradictory information appearing in the media, for example, about the numbers or dates of deliveries?

There was no deliberate strategy. We mostly refrained from commenting because ensuring the safety of the deliveries was the priority. And you can only ensure that by not talking about them at all. The contradictory information that has appeared in the public space has not come from us. Most of the time, you don't have to do anything and the speculation will start to emerge on its own. And in the case of the munitions initiative, it certainly didn't hurt anything. All that matters is that the ammunition goes where it's supposed to go.

The ammunition initiative has recently faced criticism from the opposition and some in media outlets, alleging that the ammunition might be overpriced, or that it is being bought through middlemen. What is behind this criticism? Is it the business interests of some actors or, for example, the traditional distrust of some media towards munitions companies?

I think it's a mixture of all of these and I don't want to say too much about it. The truth is that the enemy never sleeps and it is necessary not to make it easy for the enemy. The bottom line is that everything is working as planned, although of course it is not easy. It is far from just us who are supplying the ammunition. It is quite a broad operation of many countries and it is good that it is going ahead.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán recently stated that the traditional Berlin-Paris axis of power no longer exists and has been replaced by a new London-Warsaw-Kyiv axis, along with the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. Is this assessment realistic? And if so, is it a positive development?

The traditional Berlin-Paris axis, the so-called engine of the European Union, still consists of the two most important countries in the European Union today, and no other axis is so important in the Union. They have the greatest political and economic weight. It is one thing to talk about the engine of the EU, which was certainly more powerful at other times than it is today. It is then another thing to outline the agenda within Europe and the continent as a whole. Poland's role is greater today than in the past. The UK is also still a key country, notwithstanding the fact that it is no longer in the EU. But I would not overestimate the role of the Baltics. If Orbán meant it primarily with regard to Ukraine, there is no doubt that the countries in northern Europe are more active, partly because they feel more threatened.

This is also understandable for geographical reasons. Countries in the south of Europe have different problems from those in the north, such as migration from Africa. That is why they are not so active in relation to the war in Ukraine; the war is simply far away. However, I do not believe that this is something long-term, because it depends on what Europe, or parts of Europe, will have to deal with in the future. But the truth is that northern Europe is much better off economically, and in that respect the gap between the north and the south is getting wider and wider, and the military power more or less corresponds to that.

What explains Hungary's attitude and its lukewarm, non-military aid to invaded Ukraine?

First and foremost, Hungary always thinks of all Hungarians and Hungarian minorities in its surroundings. This is the center of Hungarian politics, and so Hungary's approach to Ukraine must be understood. The current position is due to the thinking and strategy of Viktor Orbán and his foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, who are playing to the strings of Greater Hungary. What Hungary is doing now is due to the leadership of these gentlemen. If someone else had been Prime Minister, it is quite possible that Hungary would have behaved differently in relation to Ukraine.

Voices are once again being raised that the Visegrad Four is a dead project in the current political constellation in Slovakia and Hungary. Why should we continue this cooperation at all?

The V4 is still functioning in the same way. Two months ago, there was a standard meeting at the prime ministerial level, and the presidents also met. The V4 is supposed to deal with practical issues of neighbourhood policy, such as border control, migration, police or transport or energy cooperation, etc. The V4 is not a grouping that could break through on its own at the EU level, because it does not have enough weight and votes according to the rules. As a result, other coalitions must always be sought. The V4 itself does not vote unanimously in the vast majority, but at the same time it is good when neighbours talk to each other and cooperate on practical matters. Yes, politically the situation is more complicated now, because in European and foreign policy the V4 countries have quite different views on some issues. But that is natural.

We should never bet on just one card. The world is a more diverse place, and if we want to push something through, or on the contrary, prevent something, we have to constantly create different alliances. And if this can be done within the V4, that is only a good thing. Let us take the example of nuclear energy. The V4 is pro-nuclear, including the as yet nuclear-free Poland. It is good to use this strength, but the V4 alone is not enough, and we need a number of other countries to succeed in this respect at the European level.

In June, the position of the Government Coordinator for Strategic Communication was created, held by Otakar Foltýn. You have often been referred to by the media as the person responsible for this issue, which you have always denied. Are you relieved?

Whoever said I was in charge of strategic communication was themselves spreading misinformation. It was usually a misinterpretation of what I actually said. And quite often, some people's beliefs were based on headlines. But the headline is created by someone other than the author of the interview, let alone the interviewee. I've never been in charge of disinformation except under the influence of a foreign power. This is something that we are working on together with a number of institutions and some of the results have been seen in recent months, for example the Voice of Europe case.

That is why I was not relieved, because I did not lose any work by the creation of the position of strategic communication coordinator. I am in charge of coordinating foreign and security policy, and disinformation cannot be seen only through the lens of security. When everything is reduced to a one-sided line, it is not to the benefit of the cause. I have always said that we should defend ourselves and fight against Putin's scum as well as, say, energy scum. But we cannot defend ourselves against these phenomena solely through repression.

Is the government as a whole, but also individual ministers, improving in strategic communication? See, for example, the unfortunate dispute between the head of the army, General Řehka, and Defence Minister Jana Černochová...

It will only be possible to judge the success of strategic communication and the results of Otakar Foltýn's team with hindsight. Unified strategic communication of the state should be ongoing. But on the other hand, let us not forget that the democratic world is built on critical thinking, dialogue, discussion and the clash of ideas and opinions. Diversity of opinion should not be restricted, but rather nurtured and encouraged. Everything has a limit and a balance must be sought. Strategic communication is supposed to defend the basic values of the free world, and that is certainly what Otakar Foltýn is trying to do.

In an interview in January, you told me that you do not rule out the possibility that neither Trump nor Biden will eventually become the new US president, but someone else. Now that may come true. From the point of view of Europe and the Czech Republic, would Donald Trump or Kamala Harris be a better US president?

We still do not know what will happen on election day. I assume it will be a duel between the current candidates, but on the other hand, a month ago it looked like a Biden-Trump duel and now Biden is out of the picture and Trump was almost shot.

One of the worst case scenarios, not only for us but for the whole world, would be a weak American president who will have the whole Congress against him. He would have a very limited ability to govern, which would be reflected in the world. The US would not be as capable, and a power vacuum would be created in many places in the world, and that by definition would be occupied by the more aggressive rather than the more decent.

Personally, I want a US that has a clear and predictable policy. Trump is unpredictable on the one hand, but even in that unpredictability there is a certain logic. Trump is a transactional man, his policies are built on "deals", which in itself is predictable. To a certain extent, he behaves rationally, even if he provokes violent emotions. How the election turns out is beyond our control and we should prepare for both options and how we will deal with the US.

With respect to foreign policy, I think we can live with Donald Trump's policies, as well as Kamala Harris' policies. After all, we won't have anything else.

It will only be good for us if we have a strong president in the US. Let everyone answer for themselves who will be the stronger American president of the pair.

With Trump's eventual ascension to the White House, many expect a decline in military aid to Ukraine, but perhaps also in the US protective umbrella within NATO itself. Will Europe be able to replace the US as a guarantor of security in Europe, but also in aid to Ukraine?

Without American help, even if Europe does what it has been doing, the situation in Ukraine will deteriorate significantly. But I don't think Trump will want to be the one to lose the war in Ukraine and allow Vladimir Putin to take Uzhhorod. I just don't think Trump will make a unilateral policy in favor of Putin and allow him to take over all of Ukraine. It would show him as a weak president. It's not in the interest of Donald Trump as a person, nor is it in the interest of the United States.

The West, including you, stresses that the terms of peace with Russia must be determined by Ukraine itself. A peace conference has been held in Switzerland, and now the Ukrainians are talking about a second one in the autumn with Russia's participation. Is such a thing realistic this year or next year? Unless the Russian regime collapses and Ukraine starts to win militarily, it will not be possible without handing over territory to Russia, will it? But even then it doesn't seem to be enough for Putin.

Ukraine will probably have to make some temporary territorial concessions. But that does not mean that it will give up its claim to all its territory. The reality is that Ukraine has not controlled its entire territory since 2014. And it is very unlikely that it will control it in the coming period either. That does not mean that there cannot be a situation, and I sincerely hope that there will be a situation, where Ukraine will once again control its entire territory. And the moment the Ukrainians and the Russians decide that it is time to stop the war and come to a ceasefire, we should respect and support that. And the farther that line of conflict is from us, the better. I have been saying since the beginning of Russia's incursion into Ukraine that I consider the most likely scenario to be that President Zelensky, or his successor in the manner of Konrad Adenauer, will say: Okay, we are temporarily giving up part of the territory, the "East Germany", and we will build a democratic, prosperous country in the west of the country we control, which will be able to defend itself together with its partners. And I think we should support such a scenario one day. Again, the more free parts of Ukraine, the better. But let us not be under the illusion that it is possible to recapture and liberate every square kilometre of Ukrainian territory tomorrow.

And isn't it already heading that way?

It is true that there is more talk about it now, but there could also be more talk for a long time to come. I said a year ago that Vladimir Putin had decided to wage an offensive war until the US election. And only on the basis of their outcome and the results on the battlefield, will he think about how to proceed further. I expect that Putin will be on the offensive for another six months or so. Then there will be no peace, but it is possible that there will be a ceasefire or a cessation of fighting. Looking around the world, ceasefires can take many forms. In some places, a ceasefire means no bullets will fly for many years, in others the line of contact between enemies is very uneasy, but it is no longer a hot, full-scale war. After all, there was some sort of ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia after 2014, or at least it looked that way from a distance, but when someone was on the line of contact, people were dying all the time, and there were at least gunfights constantly.

It remains to be seen whether and for how long such a situation will prevail after the US elections. In any case, we will have to support Ukraine even after the ceasefire, because Ukraine must be strong, it must be so armed that Russia will not attack it again in a year or two.

The war in Ukraine is in many ways specific or perhaps even unconventional. One of the things is the involvement of the civil sector, albeit certainly in conjunction with people from the security and military community, in aid, including arms. Is it more symbolic assistance, or does it also have a real impact on the battlefield itself?

I think this kind of help is important. Of course, it is not comparable with the aid provided by the US or Germany, for example. But it is a huge amount of moral support on the ground, especially in moments of material shortages for specific units that are defending themselves in Ukraine. When added together, such assistance, whether from individuals or companies, is certainly greater than the assistance provided by some of the smaller countries or, for example, Hungary.

You are one of the supporters of sending a new ambassador to Russia. Do you think it is important to have ambassadorial-level representation in Russia? What could it realistically bring to the Czech Republic? Would it not be isolated in the current state of relations between the Czech Republic and Russia?

The ambassador talks to other ambassadors of European countries, most of whom have an ambassador in Russia. And it is not just ambassadors from EU countries, but from the whole of the West. At least in this community he will be able to better promote Czech interests and opinion. This is also true in various other forums of world diplomacy, not just in Brussels. The moment you have your own person on the ground, you have first-hand information, and this gives you more weight with others and makes you more credible than if you become isolated by cutting yourself off from information.

I am not saying that it is a fundamental problem not to have an ambassador in Russia for some time. But it is a long-term problem. And it is no coincidence that Western countries have ambassadors there. Let us look at which countries have ambassadors in Russia and which do not. And then let's figure out which group of countries we want to belong to. It seems to me that we should have ambassadors in Russia. Just as we should have ambassadors in Damascus, Tehran and various other places in the world where we absolutely disagree with the policies of the regimes in question. It is a certain channel of communication that can sometimes be useful, perhaps even with regard to the fate of Czech citizens, and it gives us credibility and weight in promoting our own opinion and being heard on the international stage. Of course, this alone is not enough, but it is a piece of the whole mosaic. The other option is to say that we are a super moralistic state, but then we have to close other embassies around the world. But is that the right solution that will add credibility and respect to the Czech Republic? I am convinced that the opposite is true.

The head of the BIS, Michal Koudelka, recently warned in an interview on the thirtieth anniversary of the service's creation that the world is on the brink of a new global conflict, but that many do not realise the seriousness of the situation. Do you see it the same way?

We are living in a time when the world is far more divided, and therefore the likelihood of such a conflict is greater than in the past. But it is certainly not inevitable and a given. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, everyone in the West is very keen to ensure that the conflict does not spread and remains essentially contained. I am convinced that it is in our interest to keep it that way and that we can manage it.

The situation in the Middle East is certainly more unstable than it used to be, but the Middle East has never enjoyed stability in recent decades. And wars are commonplace there. Even if the situation seems extremely complex today, if we look back in time, we will see that it is nothing exceptional. Sure, a larger conflict may flare up, but it is not the interest of the actors in question. But even through various coincidences and unfortunate circumstances it can happen. And as for the very East, it is mainly up to China and, to some extent, North Korea to decide whether there will be a war. It cannot be ruled out.

For thirty years, Europeans have wanted the world to be multipolar because they were uncomfortable with a US hegemon. Now we have arrived and our European wish has been granted. Let everyone ask whether this was a wish that we should have prayed for or whether we would prefer to pray for a different arrangement. But it is true that we shouldn't imagine the worst. We still live in a free, safe and prosperous country. If the collective West takes care of its security and invests in its defence, everyone will reconsider whether and if at all to attack us. The world has never been a safe place and never will be. And we should behave and arrange ourselves accordingly, soberly and rationally. We have that at least partly in our hands as well.