Three years have passed since the beginning of the brutal Russian aggression in Ukraine. In his analysis, former Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces General Jiří Šedivý describes the successes and mistakes of the Ukrainian leadership during these three years and the possible dynamics of the conflict in the context of US President Donald Trump's rise to power.

Ukraine has been resisting Russian aggression for three years. But much has changed in that time. Since their initial combat successes, Russian troops have had to withdraw from the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson areas. Nevertheless, by now they have occupied a relatively large part of Ukrainian territory. After the execution of the surprise and successful offensive by Ukrainian troops in the second half of 2022, we have seen an almost proportional equalization of the combat capabilities of both sides. Unfortunately, from mid-2023 onwards, the shortcomings in the preparation of operations on the Ukrainian side, the hesitancy of the West to provide assistance to Ukraine, as well as the gradual decline in the determination of Ukrainian society to defend its territory, began to become apparent. In the first 11 months of last year, the Ukrainian prosecutor's office dealt with 60,000 cases of refusal to join the army or desertion. A November 2024 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) survey provided answers to the question of whether and how the war in Ukraine will be ended. According to it, only 34% of Ukrainians believe the war will be won. This is in contrast to the May 2024 poll, when 58% of Ukrainians declared confidence in Ukraine's victory. Almost half of them (47%) now say they expect a compromise solution.

Russian desertion problems

Russia made extensive use of equipment stored in its warehouses, often from the Cold War era, and of the superior number of reserves it could use to replace losses. Yet, to push Ukrainian troops out of the Kursk region, Russia needs the help of the North Korean regime. Although we do not have precise information about Russian public opinion, there is certainly a major defection problem on the Russian side as well. According to the Russian independent portal Mediazona, in 2024 there was a significant increase in the number of cases where Russian soldiers were prosecuted for refusing military service. Compared to the previous year, the number has almost doubled. Reportedly, in 2024, Russian military courts dealt with 10,308 cases of soldiers who refused to perform service. In 2023, it was 5,517 cases. But I dare to doubt whether these figures depict reality.

But this war also means fundamental changes in political relations in Europe and changes in US policy. Although the basic direction of NATO and the EU has not changed, Europe has become united in some ways, but in others its unity is breaking down. This, of course, has implications for the overall situation on the battlefield.

Political interference in the conduct of the war

The current situation on the Ukrainian battlefield is, on the whole, unfavourable for Ukraine and a poor testament to the effectiveness of our assistance, including what the United States has been doing. Since 2023, Ukraine has not found a recipe to stop the Russian advance and has allowed their way of fighting to be imposed on it. This was already evident in 2023 in the first phase of the so-called counter-offensive, which was supposed to bring decisive victories for Ukrainian troops on the southern front, including the liberation of Crimea. Ukraine was unable to use the potential it had accumulated during the counter-offensive in the second half of 2022. Its leadership failed to maintain unity, which was reflected in the departure of the army leadership headed by General Zaluzhny. The political interference in the conduct of the war and the postponement of widespread mobilization eventually exhausted the army at the front, but it also had a negative effect on the Ukrainian population. The decision to launch an attack on Russian territory in the Kursk area seems like a good decision, but in effect it drained not only a large number of well-trained troops, but also much of the material support from the threatened eastern (Donbas) front. Even though Russia had to move some of its troops into the Kursk area and take advantage of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's offer to reinforce Russian troops with 11 or 12 thousand North Korean soldiers, the Russian penetration deep into Ukrainian territory on the Donbas part of the battlefield has failed to stop the Ukrainian army.

Ukraine's big leap in unmanned aerial vehicles

The Ukrainian military's failures have been compounded by the interruption of US aid and, as usual, our slow assistance. On the other hand, Ukraine has been successful in compensating for restrictions on the use of weapons supplied by Western allies. Ukraine has made huge leaps in the development and use of unmanned aerial vehicles, with which it is systematically destroying Russian capabilities far behind the front lines. This may lead to a reduction in Russia's capacity to continue to wage war against Ukraine with impunity. According to the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, Budanov, Ukrainian drones can hit targets in Russia up to 1,800 kilometres away.

Ukraine is already using a home-made missile drone called "Palyanytsia". This will allow it to hit territory deep in Russia. Ukraine is thus circumventing the ongoing restrictions on the use of Western-supplied missiles. It should be noted that Moscow is only 700 kilometres from Ukrainian territory. Ukraine has also taken a significant step in the development of naval drones, of which the V5 'Magura' naval drone is a representative. Slowly, but surely, the Ukrainian Air Force is being re-equipped with F 16 aircraft and, more recently, the French Mirage 2000.

Despite a number of measures and considerable aid, Russia occupied almost the entire Luhansk region at the end of the third year of the war. It can be assumed that Russia will place greater emphasis on the Donetsk region. This logic can also be seen in the current fighting in the area west of Bakhmut, where the final battles for Chasiv Yar and Toretsk are taking place. The objective is the confluence of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk and the completion of the occupation of this part of the Donetsk region. Some Russian politicians, led by the Chairman of the Russian Security Council D. Medvedev consider it necessary to take advantage of the current combat successes on the eastern front and continue to occupy Kharkiv and the left-bank part of the Dnipropetrovsk region. A significantly problematic direction is the Pokrovsk region, which the Russians are bypassing to the west. A few kilometres west of Pokrovsk is already the border of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.  If the Russians were able to advance along the E50 road and reach the left bank of the Dnieper at the Dnipro agglomeration (about 180 km from Pokrovsk), they would have the opportunity to complete the link between the north and south of the battlefield on the left (east) bank of the Dnieper. This would cause major problems for Ukrainian troops in terms of supply and maneuverability, especially in the southern part of the battlefield.

The outcome of the war this year will also be affected by the outcome of the battle for the Kursk region. If Ukraine does not hold the breakthrough, it will have a profound negative effect on the further conduct of the war, and especially on the morale of the troops and the population of Ukraine. Until the northern part of the front is resolved, including the Kursk breakthrough, the southern part (Zaporizhzhya) will be more passive.

Trump's efforts to negotiate with Putin may not be productive

I'm going to take the liberty at this point of omitting speculation related to the rise of D. Trump's ascension to the US presidency and what effect this will have on the situation on the battlefield. It can be assumed that President Trump's activities will be of great importance for the future development. The intensity of the conflict will depend on the negotiations between Trump and Putin. The current Trump-led pressure on all sides may be counterproductive as a result. In relation to Ukraine, it may create a situation where aid is delayed as a result of Trump's attempt to resolve the war by pressuring Russia. But by now we know of few untested options, including strongman statements designed to intimidate Putin. That is very unlikely to happen. Putin cannot accept a cessation of fighting on the current line because the task of annexing the four "Russian republics" by fully controlling them would not be accomplished. If Putin were to agree to the presence of peacekeepers sent by European states, mostly NATO members, on this line, he would admit that Russia is unable to secure its own borders. But much more serious would be the fact that these would be troops from NATO states, perhaps even the US, which President Zelensky of Ukraine keeps talking about, although President Trump keeps saying that the Europeans should perform this task. NATO has already approached the Russian border in the north, and here it would be in a different form on the entire Ukrainian-Russian border, that is to say, on the main strategic route, if we take into account the territory of Belarus.

Timely and necessary assistance from NATO and EU partners will continue to be essential. Both military and economic, including the tightening of sanctions. However, it must be added to this that Trump's uncoordinated attack 'against all' will also create counter-pressure, including the formation of mutually supportive groups of states against Trump's pressure. Leaving aside Greenland or Panama, in our case, China's relationship with the US may become more extreme, with China and Russia becoming even closer. The consultation between Xi Jinping and Putin after President Trump's speech and their confirmation of their strategic partnership should be a warning. North Korea and Iran will continue to be in this group.

Rise of radical political entities in Europe means reduced support for Ukraine

The conflict will also affect our exhaustion and limited ability to send large quantities of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine. Although some measures have been taken in this regard, the European defence industry is operating in a normal peacetime environment, which reduces its capacity to act. Even the EU's financial resources are not inexhaustible, and Europe has problems other than Ukraine. One of them is the dismal state of our economies, which is likely to be exacerbated by Trump's pressure to balance the EU/US relationship and his 'tariff theory'.

Increasingly intense debates on energy prices and the Green Deal, but above all the radicalisation of Islamic minorities that has spread since 2015, repeated attacks often ending in death and an unwillingness to integrate into mainstream societies, are bringing popularity to far-right political parties in much of Europe. I do not need to give examples. For the most part, these political entities are not very keen on further large-scale aid to Ukraine and are preoccupied with their own internal problems. It follows that Ukraine will have to rely more on itself.

Although not directly related to Ukraine, Trump's push to allocate up to 5% of GDP to defence may split NATO unity and may exacerbate the economic problems of some states that are not prepared for such a strain on their national budgets.

In recent days, President Zelensky has been hinting at some concessions from his positions and admitting the possibility of negotiations. Nevertheless, no fundamental change can be expected from Ukraine. First of all, President Zelensky insists on the original terms of the end of the war. The so-called just peace is a repetition of one and the same thing in several variants, i.e. the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied territory, entry into NATO and the EU, and no restrictions on Ukraine's armed forces. It does not matter how these conditions are presented, e.g. as a 'formula for victory', etc. Unfortunately, most of Zelensky's recent speeches bear the hallmarks of a strong exaggeration of his own (Ukrainian) exceptionalism and, at the same time, a pressure for European states, the US or NATO to take responsibility for stopping the Russians and complete victory. There has even been a renewed threat of a return to nuclear weapons ownership if Ukraine's security is not adequately guaranteed.

Mistakes of the Ukrainian leadership

But the Ukrainian leadership itself did not do everything possible to win. Ukraine did not make use of the amazing potential accumulated by the successful counter-offensive in the second half of 2022. Unfortunately, since then, probably due to a wrong assessment of the state of Ukrainian society and military, as well as of the political situation in Europe, the Ukrainian leadership has made several fundamental mistakes. The short answer is that Ukraine lost this war in the first half of 2023. Since then, even the international community has moved from saying that the Russians must be pushed out of the whole of Ukrainian territory to the view that it cannot be assumed that Russia will have to leave the whole of Ukrainian territory, although some politicians, such as (and not only) Polish leaders, still think so.

The newly inaugurated adviser to the US president, Michael Waltz, recently said, "Everybody knows there has to be a diplomatic end to this. ...I don't think it's realistic to say we're going to drive every Russian off every inch of Ukrainian soil, including Crimea." The US is still Ukraine's biggest supporter. It sounds like a possible solution, but offering a country's mineral wealth in exchange for help in fighting Russian aggression is disadvantageous to Ukraine in the long run. The moral issue of helping Ukraine in its just struggle against the aggressor would thus become a matter of simple business trade.

Against the view of pushing Russia out of the entire territory of Ukraine stands the constantly repeated position of the Russian leadership, namely that the four Ukrainian regions are Russian territory, Ukraine will not join NATO and the size of the Ukrainian army will be reduced. The current situation has not yet ripened on either side to start negotiations, although on 9 February, according to the US New York Post, Trump spoke by phone with V. Putin about ending the war. It is not clear when this phone call actually took place. The Kremlin declined to comment on the report.

What does Ukraine need?

How successful the new US administration's push to stop the war will be is not clear at this point. Unfortunately, Russia is still in a better position than Ukraine. Rather, in recent months, it appears that the international security situation is deteriorating and the distance to a large-scale military conflict is shortening.

What can we do to help Ukraine? Let us lift all restrictions on Ukraine's use of received weapons, and let us provide Ukraine with everything it needs. Ukraine needs to mobilise its army and, with our help, lose the fighting men who left for EU countries before the war. This is not easy, but without a replenished army Ukraine will not win the war.