The challenges that the Czech Army has been addressing in recent years are in many cases transnational and are thus also relevant in other NATO member states. That is why we asked Lieutenant General Ivo Střecha, the military representative of the Czech Republic to NATO and the European Union, for an interview in which we discussed, for example, the issue of recruitment and the related topic of the reintroduction of full-time service, the lower level of resilience of society, the willingness to participate in the defence of the state, the emergence of new technologies and much more.

Is recruitment a similarly pressing issue for other NATO member armies as it is for the Czech Army?

This topic has of course made its way onto the agenda of the Military Committee and the tasks of NATO strategic commanders in SHAPE and ACT have been issued, it is obvious that a large number of member states are more or less dealing with this problem. One of the first concrete actions was a meeting of the staff directors of the member states to share experiences here at NATO HQ at the end of last year. In discussions with my counterparts here at NATO HQ, a diversity of approaches is evident. Some of the Nordic countries are building on the overall willingness of the population to defend their country at all costs, regardless of the final outcome. Our immediate neighbours are taking the route of increasing the salaries of soldiers or certain benefits, and some have chosen the option of investing in education at all levels. However, I do not think that there is a one-size-fits-all solution. Each country will have to deal with this problem on its own. But we can learn from each other within the Alliance and try new models, or not go for them because they have not worked elsewhere. To do this, it is important to reflect the reality of a given society, its legislative limits and conditions of service. These different factors also determine that what works elsewhere may not work here and vice versa.

Are the Alliance countries addressing the introduction of attendance services?

If we mean basic military service, then some countries, such as Finland or Norway, still have it and some are considering reintroducing it. From a purely military perspective, in the context of the current unfavourable development of the security environment and the experience of the war in Ukraine, the discussion about the ability of a state to generate and maintain combat power in a longer-term conflict has a legitimate basis. And some form of attendance could be one solution. But in today's security context, presumptive service is not self-sufficient. The debate is primarily about the resilience of the whole society and the resilience of all critical activities necessary for the running of the state. At the Alliance, we call this the Whole-of-Society approach.  Simply put, we need to address going forward whether the current model of our military is sufficient to sustain our defense. Defence is and will be a whole-of-society issue.

Are there any countries that we could take inspiration from in recruiting new soldiers and to what extent, given the cultural and social differences between countries, is it possible to share experiences?

Cultural and social concerns, as well as the level of threat perception of the population, are crucial. We cannot fully apply something that is not close to us or historically our own. But that does not mean that we should not learn something from our partners. The theme of patriotism resonates particularly in the Nordic countries and the Baltic States. There are interesting projects in France, for example, where, as part of the sustainability of personnel, they are expanding projects to support family members and wounded soldiers, while at the same time focusing on raising the level of education of the population and introducing a conscription day in secondary schools, which is a kind of equivalent to our POKOS, but in their country it is compulsory for all schools.

What other cross-cutting challenges do most Alliance member states address?

The challenges are many - unfavourable demographic development, deteriorating health of the young population, competitiveness on the labour market, lower level of resilience of society and willingness to participate in national defence or the emergence of new technologies are just some of them. There are many public opinion polls and sociological surveys that identify these factors and their causes. Of course, they all address the financial challenge and the replenishment of existing capabilities or the building of entirely new capabilities that were overlooked or not a major priority in the expeditionary force era. Specifically, we can talk about missile defence.

In your opinion, what is the level of preparation of the population for national defence in the Alliance members compared to POKOS (Preparing citizens for national defence) program in the Czech Republic?

Nordic programmes are publicly known and interesting Sweden and Switzerland have civil defence programmes that include training citizens in crisis management, first aid and basic defence skills Finland and Norway also have a system for training citizens in crisis management, evacuation and first aid They organise regular exercises simulating different crisis situations to prepare citizens for real threats Estonia has cyber security and defence programmes that include training citizens in cyber-attack protection and crisis management There is a lot of.

Understandably, the level of urgency is higher there, and the Whole-of-Society approach mentioned here has long been supported and developed I think that POKOS in our country is the right way to go. Its new concept for the period 2025-2030 has recently been approved. This concept responds to the deteriorating security situation in Europe and emphasises the wider involvement of the whole of society in defence preparations However, I am not in a position to assess the degree of effectiveness This task does not fall within my portfolio.

How does the military and defence industry link up abroad to streamline military supply?

NATO recently adopted a new call for expanded industrial capacity at the Nice Summit This call, known as the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge, was signed last July The aim is to increase defence industrial capacity and accelerate production across the Alliance.

The challenge includes long-term actions such as developing national plans to strengthen industrial capacity, accelerating multinational procurement, improving the implementation of standards to increase interoperability, and removing barriers to trade and investment The Alliance also pledged to deliver critical capabilities in the short term, particularly in the areas of munitions and air and missile defence systems This is an important step towards strengthening the defence industry and ensuring the security of NATO member states.

This June, the new Capability Targets (CT) 2025 will be adopted. Can the Czech Republic meet the CT targets with the enacted defence spending of 2% of GDP?

As you stated, CT 25 is not yet approved, but within the preliminary estimates, it is safe to say that it will not be possible. And that is also because we are not able to fully comply with the current CT 21 either.

Where do you think other states stand on CT 2025 compliance? 

In the context of the war in Europe and the associated "rediscovery" of the requirements for capabilities needed for collective defence, the latest edition of the new force-building objectives has a completely different dimension than the previous ones. It clearly shows where we are most deficient after years of peacekeeping operations. The most complex tasks go into areas that we did not need or were not yet known in those operations. Air defense, unmanned systems and defenses against them, the need to operate in new domains such as cyberspace, space, the increase in the number of heavier combat formations, the ability to effectively engage targets deep in adversary territory are just a few. With two per cent of GDP going to defence, we are not even able to meet CT 21 anytime soon, let alone CT 25.

US President Donald Trump is talking about the need for Alliance member states to spend 5% of GDP on defence. What are the views from NATO leadership on this new direction and optimal defence spending?

In my opinion, 5% is currently out of touch with reality. It's not just about the money, as painful as it would be to find, but the ability to spend it meaningfully. Defence industry capacity, particularly in Europe, is inadequate and acquisition processes are still very complicated. Nothing official has been said here (in Brussels), but 3% is currently a realistic amount to discuss. Everything will depend on the development of the security situation.

Given the rapid rearmament of the Allied armies, is it possible at present to spend the increased budgets of the armies in an effective manner? In your opinion, can manufacturers meet the increased demand within reasonable timeframes?

We all know that the worst time to start arming is when a crisis starts. The defence industry, despite a lot of pressure from governments, is not increasing its capacity at the rate we would like. That is why commodity prices are also rising significantly. It costs a lot of money to expand capacity, to speed up production, and the industry would have to bear the risks that are associated with a potential easing of tensions in international relations and a reduction in production requirements. It is mostly the private sector for which long-term contracts are essential.

On the other hand, it is obvious that this need is huge and here I can refer to the words of the now former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Bauer, that he does not understand how anyone can miss such an opportunity. But this is a very complex problem with no simple solution.

Isn't the social mood changing in individual NATO member states regarding the increased need for defence spending?

It is changing, and fundamentally. Naturally, this is related to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the mood in society, the understanding of the level of danger and the level of responsibility to voluntarily assume conscription among the population. It is quite obvious that there is a need to spend more on defence throughout the Alliance than has been the case in the recent past. Whether it is enough is another question. The change in the security situation is not only due to the war in Ukraine, but Ukraine is already quite close, so the social impact is considerable, especially in a situation where Russia is not only attacking military facilities, but is basically flattening entire cities. In this situation, it is clear that it is no longer 'just' about soldiers, but basically about everyone.

NATO has its political and military leadership. Do these two components coincide when it comes to building European defence? 

Politicians decide what European defence will look like, and soldiers can only bring their perspective. What we soldiers are trying to do is to explain to politicians that defence is a society-wide issue and that other instruments of state power, such as diplomacy, information, economic measures, must be used effectively. And when it comes to the armed forces, they cannot succeed in conflicts like the one in Ukraine without the support of the population.

The cooperation is solid, but sometimes we have to point out to our political partners that the long-neglected armed forces are not able to do everything that is currently required of them. The role of the military committee is to provide independent military advice to the political leadership of both organisations.

In your opinion, how appropriate and necessary is the standardisation of the Alliance's armaments? 

Standardisation, interoperability and interchangeability are words the public cannot understand Perhaps abstract in what they mean by it. But what it does mean for us is the ability for different national armies to operate together in conflict, and that is an absolute priority, indeed these capabilities are the cornerstone for conducting so-called multi-domain operations in the near future In terms of processes, structures, doctrines, there is almost nothing to solve, it works If we start talking about technical things, the national defence industry, the private sector and its interests come into play That's a completely different story.

Even in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, where the defence industry was centrally controlled, it was not possible to achieve complete interoperability, and everything was decided by the states under the baton of the former Soviet Union The ideal state of all alliance states being able to complement each other, to share spare parts or munitions, to simply communicate with each other on all platforms, is not here and probably will not be However, STANAGs help improve cooperation and compatibility.

Could the current process of unanimous approval within NATO jeopardise the overall effectiveness of the Alliance in the future?

This principle is the basis of the foundation of the organisation. Sometimes I, too, feel a certain degree of frustration at the reasons why states cannot agree on something. In any case, I think that abandoning this principle would lead to the fragmentation of the Alliance. I firmly believe that in the event of a real crisis, this will not be a problem. It is primarily a matter of defending the fundamental values that the Member States share, and these do not change fundamentally after every democratic election in each Member State.

In general terms, does the current conflict in Ukraine in any way change the NATO command's view of the representation and role of different types of troops on the modern battlefield?

Rather than a change, I'd call it an adaptation. Adaptation is necessary with the advent of new technologies and because current wars are being fought in domains that did not play such a role before. I've already touched on this a bit on the interoperability issue. Thanks to the favourable security situation, the Alliance has for many years been mainly devoted to crisis management and security cooperation. Fulfilling the principles of collective defence, for example, in the form of meeting the commitment of 2% of GDP for the defence budget, has been a bit of a side issue for most states. This has led to a reduction in defence spending, a reduction in the size of the armed forces, and a shift to a small professional, more or less expeditionary force. Investments went into weapons systems that do not have the necessary effect in a major war. Most states simply no longer envisaged a major conflict in Europe, and everything adapted to that. The return to the status quo ante will be painful. We need to talk again about concepts such as state and societal resilience, an effective defence industry, war stocks, security of supply, mobilisation, etc.

How do NATO representatives perceive the US indirect threat to its ally Denmark in the form of the use of force against its territory, Greenland?

This issue is a highly political matter between two countries and is not the subject of official negotiations or informal discussions in either NATO or the EU. Unity and cohesion remains the cornerstone of the Alliance and bringing this discussion - whether intentionally or unintentionally - to the Alliance or the EU would give this issue a whole new dimension.

How has the war in Ukraine changed the security environment in Europe and how is NATO responding to these changes?

Even the war in Georgia, the seizure of Crimea and the armed conflicts in eastern Ukraine were not sufficient warnings. Today it is different. The Alliance has done a tremendous amount of work to strengthen defences in many areas. The Defence and Deterrence Concept has initiated an extensive process of defence planning in all domains and at all levels. There has been a harmonisation of National Plans with Alliance plans. The command structure has been adapted. Cooperation with partners such as the EU, Indo-Pacific countries has been strengthened, budgets are being increased, defence planning has set ambitious force building targets, defence industry and industrial cooperation is being strengthened, and new technologies are being introduced. There are many concrete steps, and we must not forget that all this is taking place in conditions of permanent massive support for Ukraine.

What are the main challenges facing NATO in the context of the prolonged conflict in Ukraine and how does the Alliance plan to maintain the unity and cohesion of its members?

These are mainly increased demands on defence spending, strengthening defence capabilities and meeting Capability Targets, tasks related to deterrence and strengthening collective defence, and last but not least political coordination and deepening political consultation and coordination between Member States.

Maintaining unity and the capacity for effective partnership are two key challenges. Russian destabilisation operations are being conducted in all countries. The willingness of states to continue to support Ukraine and to develop the capabilities of the armed forces as part of the deterrence is a prerequisite.

What are the options for de-escalating the conflict in Ukraine and what role could NATO play in this process?

NATO's constructive role in ending the conflict will be very difficult because, as Russia's representatives have repeatedly stated, NATO is an enemy of Russia. The Czech Republic is also on the list of enemy states. The issue of escalation and, for that matter, de-escalation, is given a great deal of attention here. Every decision, measure and strategic communication is carefully assessed and discussed through this lens. However, there must be a will on all sides to end the conflict. It will not be possible without compromises, which will have to be made by all parties to the conflict. A just peace is not likely to happen. From NATO's point of view, it is important that this situation does not create a breeding ground for further and much greater armed conflict in the future. Believe me, this discussion is not easy, 32 states, 32 positions.

However, what the member states of the Alliance can do for this negotiation is to support Ukraine as much as possible so that it has the best possible negotiating conditions and therefore a stronger position. Last year, Alliance member states exceeded their target and provided Ukraine with security assistance in excess of 50 billion euros. The original target was to provide €40 billion in aid to Ukraine.

How does the war in Ukraine affect NATO's relations with Russia and how should the Alliance approach future dialogue with Moscow?

For more than 30 years, NATO has sought to build a partnership with Russia, to develop dialogue and practical cooperation in areas of common interest. But Russia has violated and continues to violate the norms and principles that contribute to a stable and predictable European security order. By invading Ukraine, the Russian Federation has become the most significant and direct threat to our security. Although NATO officially declares that it remains willing to maintain channels of communication with Moscow to mitigate risks and prevent escalation, it is important that Putin understands that the West is united.

The May summit in The Hague will tell us how relations will develop further. The Alliance must present itself as a confident and strong organisation, ready to defend its interests and those of its members. It has all the prerequisites for this. Even so, some level of dialogue must exist in the future. It is clear that it is unlikely to reach the previous level because mutual trust has been fundamentally undermined by Russia.

What are the implications of the war in Ukraine for the global security architecture and what role should NATO play in building a new world order?

The war in Ukraine has contributed to the return of geopolitical thinking, where national interests and spheres of influence once again play a key role. NATO is first and foremost a defence alliance, representing the interests and values of billions of people on this planet, the largest economy in the world, and possessing the greatest military power and technological base. If we can maintain unity, sustain existing and develop further partnerships, NATO and its member states will undoubtedly continue to be an important part of the world's security architecture.